By Ian Graham
In a briefing yesterday with Dutch army Maj. Gen. Mart de Kruif at the Pentagon, the general discussed a lot of the issues facing Afghanistan and his opinion of the new strategy for the war.
As the former commander of the International Security Assistance Force’s Regional Command South, de Kruif knows firsthand the challenges forces face in the most volatile region of Afghanistan. He also knows what’s worked and what hasn’t for the troops on the ground.
View the complete interview:
What de Kruif had to say was particularly interesting, because it’s an observation I made recently after hearing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen speak to different agencies about the strategy, and listening to President Barack Obama’s remarks at West Point and in Oslo – this new strategy, isn’t really “new.”
Certainly, it’s a big development to send such a large number of troops into combat, but they aren’t going over there blindly. U.S. Marines and international forces have been, as de Kruif said today, “proving that the concept [of counter-insurgency tactics] is right.”
The problem so far, de Kruif explained, is that there are only “inkblots” of security across Afghanistan that need to be expanded into a larger security footprint. By denying the insurgents any sort of gap in security coverage to hide in, the more populous regions will become safer.
“You can’t do just a little bit of counterinsurgency,” the general said. “You do counterinsurgency and protect 90 to 95 percent of the population, or you don’t do counterinsurgency at all.”
For example, right now the city of Kandahar is “absolutely not secure,” because there are such large security gaps in rural area surrounding the city.
“This is a rural insurgency,” he said. “He who can secure and protect the people in rural areas will ultimately have control over security in the cities.”
A part of that problem, he said, is the Afghan National Army is respected nationally and seen as a strong, independent organization – the Afghan National Police is not, because they largely don’t have a nation-wide strategy or plan for operations.
“We are building a plan while flying,” de Kruif said. In countries like Bosnia, where he served previously, there’s already a cultural awareness of what a police force does. Afghan culture, though, doesn’t have an archetype that matches our idea of “police.”
Integrating ideals of modern governance and the tribal systems that still dominate rural areas is the key to “winning” in Afghanistan. As the Afghan tribes begin to recognize and trust in the national government, and see it works with them, not against them, there will be serious progress against the Taliban and other insurgent groups.
That’s where the civilian effort comes into play. Diplomats and aid workers that can help Afghans establish good governance that allows the people to prosper will cut most of the recruiting power insurgents have.
“What we’ll see in the long run is, if you protect the people, you’ll see the degradation of support [for insurgents] coming from the people,” de Kruif said.
But despite the problems ISAF faces in Afghanistan, he said there has been progress. Areas where Afghans don’t feel threatened or intimidated by insurgents have opened up – the locals trust ISAF and Afghan troops and the towns are thriving.
“By far the best benchmark has been this year, the cars and stores opening up at the bazaar,” de Kruif said.
Read more about de Kruif’s briefing at Defense.gov.
Recent Comments