

Department of Defense Bloggers Roundtable With Major General Walter M. Golden Jr., Deputy Commander for Police, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) Via Teleconference from Afghanistan Subject: Afghan National Police Time: 11:33 a.m. EDT Date: Thursday, September 29, 2011

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PETTY OFFICER WILLIAM SELBY (Office of the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs): And I'd like to welcome you all to the Department of Defense's Bloggers Roundtable for Thursday, September 29th, 2011. My name is Petty Officer William Selby with the Office of the Secretary of Defense Public Affairs, and I will be moderating the call.

Today we are honored to have as our guest Major General Golden, who will discuss four items: The four Afghan National -- I'm sorry -- the four Afghan National Police pillars: the equipment that they will be receiving over the next eight months; how the coalition is trying to obtain balance; quality and sustainment; and finally, the transition of the ANP to Afghan control. A note to our bloggers on the line today: Please remember to clearly state your name and blog or organization in advance of your question. Respect the general's time, and keep your questions succinct and to the point. And if you are not asking a question, we ask that you place your phone on mute.

Sir, with that, Major General Golden, if you have an opening statement, the floor is yours, sir.

MAJOR GENERAL WALTER GOLDEN: Thank you very much. And I do have an opening statement.

First, I'd like to thank everyone for joining me this evening -- Perhaps it's morning or afternoon where you're at -- to talk about NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan's efforts advising and training the Afghan National Police.

First, I'd like to just establish a foundation for you if I can and take a few minutes to explain the four pillars that comprise the Afghan National Police.

The first pillar -- and I'll describe each in some detail -- is the Afghan Uniformed Police. The second pillar are the Afghan National

Civil Order Police. The third is the Afghan Border Police. And the fourth pillar is the Afghan Anti-Crime Police.

The Afghan Uniformed Police are the primary means of policing in Afghanistan. They wear blue uniforms and are the traffic police, fire and rescue departments and are divided into seven regional zones and 34 provinces. As of 26 September, there are approximately 79,500 members of the Afghan Uniformed Police, and their ranks include 16,900 Ministry of Interior staff and enablers for a grand total of 96,400. By November of 2012, we expect them to reach a ceiling of 157,000 in all of the Afghan -
- (inaudible) -- police.

The second pillar is the Afghan National Civil Order Police or ANCOP. Their mission is counterinsurgency. They respond to crises and perform riot control and anti-terror response, as well as dealing with counternarcotics. ANCOP wears a pixelated green and tan army-type uniform. In August, the 5th ANCOP brigade stood up in Helmand province. So right now, ANCOP has five brigades and 21 battalions, or as the Afghans call them, "kandaks." That's their word for battalion.

Currently, there are approximately 12,000 ANCOP members. They are an elite force within the ANP that require a higher level of education, third-level literacy, and 14 weeks of training: eight weeks of basic patrolman training and six more weeks of ANCOP-specific training.

The Afghan Border Police patrols and secures up to 50 kilometers into the border of Afghanistan and control all of the entry ports such as airports and border-crossing points. They are in charge of customs operations. The ABP, Afghan Border Police, wear a khaki and gray uniform with black and white leopard spots. There are about 20,000 members in the ABP.

The Afghan Anticrime Police has all the investigative and police intelligence capacities. They are responsible for counterterrorism, counternarcotics, police intelligence, criminal investigations, major crimes task force, police special units and forensics.

In addition to these four main pillars, the deputy commander for police also has responsibility to aid in the development of the Afghan local police and the Afghan protective -- personal protective force, which will be a state-owned enterprise.

Since NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan was established in 2009, a short two years ago, we've been building the police force as quickly as possible to the necessary levels to restore and maintain peace. The original plan was to recruit, then assign, then train. This meant that after recruiting, ANP members were sent to their units for hands-on learning. And later, as classes opened up, they were recalled for their formal training. We soon discovered that recalling policemen from their units for training wasn't always either easy or possible.

Recently, we've reverted to a recruit-train-assign model, with a view to improving the quality of policemen and emphasizing quality over quantity.

This is paying great dividends in the fielded force, where the majority have received the same standardized training.

On October 1st of this year all basic patrolman training will change from six to eight weeks long. This is just one more step we have taken to ensure the patrolmen are receiving the quality, focused training they need to serve the Afghan people. We are strongly committed to delivering quantity with quality. We've run three test pilot classes of the eight-week course this summer, and each was a -- was a big success.

Some of the courses that were improved, including expanding human and gender rights training to 18 hours; transparency and accountability to five hours; rule for the police use of force, four hours; diversity awareness, two hours; and on -- I can name these for you in greater detail if you're interested. This change increased the training from a total of 200 to 268 hours. Literacy training increased from 64 to 96 hours, and a final two-day exercise was added to the end of the course to test and demonstrate proficiency in each of the learning objectives.

Literacy is also a critical part of our training. It is essential for the Afghan National Police to do their jobs. They need to write tickets, read and write down the serial number of their weapons and read their paycheck to make sure they aren't being cheated out of money they have earned. Having a literate police force is critical to restoring the people's faith in the police force and in removing corruption from its ranks.

The Afghan national literacy rate is 28 percent, and 9-out-of-10 ANP recruits are illiterate and innumerate.

As of mid-September, we had over 30,000 ANP members in literacy training. All patrolmen must have a first grade literacy level, and currently over 36,000 have passed the test. Once they have graduated from basic literacy training, they receive additional training in the field to pass the second and third levels of literacy.

Respectively, over 22,000 and 13,600 have passed those literacy level tests. That's over 72,937 Afghan policemen who can now read and write thanks to the literacy training provided by NTM-A.

It is important to note that literacy is considered the foundational training for all police officers. It remains the very foundation needed to ensure an enduring force is achieved.

Another aspect of quality that we in DCOM-Police feel is important is -- are noncommissioned officers. Previously, the ANP did not have any NCOs, which left a gap in their leadership. When used properly, NCOs, noncommissioned officers, will allow the ANP to be a more

effective force with a greater sense of discipline, awareness and standards.

The final aspect of quality that I will touch on is the number of untrained patrolmen. Remember when I mentioned the recruit, assign, train model earlier. This basically created a force of personnel that have not received dedicated training and has continued as the number of recruits has occasionally exceeded training capacity, making the new recruits ripe for recruit, assign, train by district and provisional police chiefs who needed to build their respective forces rapidly. We are working hard with Afghan leadership to reduce the number of untrained patrolmen.

As we continue to stress self-sustainment of the local -- of the Afghan National Police, we are providing them with the equipment they need to perform their mission. It started this summer and will continue through March as the security forces in Afghanistan receive \$2.7 billion worth of aircraft, communications equipment, weapons and vehicles.

The police portion of this will receive a sizable chunk of this equipment, and it will help bring them to their authorized issuance of each type of equipment. In aggregate, the Afghan National Police will receive 9,800 vehicles, 11,816 various types of weapons, and 13,313 different types of communications equipment between August and March of 2012. A key aspect of sustainment beyond the security transition is the ability of the Afghan National Police to maintain facilities and to support police regardless of location in the nation. We are working now to assist the ANP force in building the plan and infrastructure needed to sustain that 157,000-man force in the future.

Finally, I'd like to talk about the transition of ANP to Afghan control. One way we've started this transition is with train-the-trainer courses. We want the ANP to continue to sustain their numbers in training beyond 2014, so we have, over the past few years, begun to teach less and less of the classes. Over half of the classes are now taught by Afghan National Police trainers. That is a success, and we'll continue to increase our Afghan trainers as we are able to hold more train-the-trainer classes at various training locations around the country. This is part of our goal of developing leaders within the ANP.

It will help to ensure that the ANP continues to grow and becomes a sustainable and autonomous police force that serves and protects the people of Afghanistan.

I know I've said a lot but I am passionate about what I'm doing here in Afghanistan with the NTM-A team, building a better police for Afghanistan. At this time, I'll open up the floor for your questions.

PETTY OFFICER SELBY: Thank you very much, sir. And Chuck, you're first on the line.

Q: Good morning, General. Chuck Simmins from America's North Shore Journal.

GEN. GOLDEN: Good morning, sir.

Q: First of all, when you were giving numbers of the police, you -- I didn't catch a number for the anticrime police. Do you have a number for those?

GEN. GOLDEN: Give me just a second. I'm sure I've got it here someplace. The Afghan -- which one did you ask me for? Civil order police?

Q: Anticrime.

GEN. GOLDEN: Yeah, the ANCOP, Afghan National Civil Order Police, number about 12,400.

Q: No, the anticrime folks. The last category you talked about.

GEN. GOLDEN: Yeah. I'll get -- yeah. I'll get back to you on that.

Q: OK.

GEN. GOLDEN: I don't have that number here in front of me.

Q: All right.

In the last six months or so, the -- various localities have been transitioning to Afghan control. And the terrorists, the Taliban and the Haqqanis and them have -- seem to have developed a tactic of demonstrating that they can strike in areas under Afghan control. Is that a correct assessment? And then how are we helping the Afghan police secure the areas under their control?

GEN. GOLDEN: Well, thank you for that question. I think your assessment is at least partially correct. I agree with you that the Taliban thinks it's important to go to not only some of the transitioned areas but some of the additional areas as well to demonstrate that they are still a capable fighting force that can -- that can compete for control of Afghanistan. And I think they've attempted to demonstrate that a couple of times, but actually the scale of what they're attempting is actually much smaller than what they've done typically in the past.

I'll mention just a couple of specific instances, if I may. They lodged -- they attempted a complex attack against a hotel here in Kabul at the end of June or beginning of July. And most recently they attempted the attack on the U.S. embassy and the -- and the ISAF headquarters. In both those instances, you know, they really didn't achieve their objectives. I mean, they received a lot of press, but the spectacular attack that they were looking for with a mass number of casualties did not occur.

And I attribute that in large measure -- at least in those two instances -- to the response that was provided by some of the special

police units here in Afghanistan. They had some assistance by coalition advisers and some assistance with rotary wing support, but the actual clearing of both buildings as well as the elimination of the terrorists was all accomplished by Afghan special police units.

And so I think the training that's been provided to the police, both by NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan from an institutional standpoint as well as the partnering that occurs with the intermediate Joint Command once they're actually out in the field in force, are beginning to pay dividends, and I think that's really pretty remarkable, again, when I describe for you that both of those commands have been stood up within the last two years.

Q: Thank you, sir.

PETTY OFFICER SELBY: Thank you.

GEN. GOLDEN: Thank you.

PETTY OFFICER SELBY: And Paul.

Q: Yeah. Hi, sir. Thanks so much for talking to us today; appreciate it.

Given that we're sending 9,800 vehicles to the ANP next year, I'm just curious what you're doing to train the Afghans to maintain them, especially after we pull out and hand over control to the Afghans and, along with that, goes, I guess, logistics, et cetera, et cetera.

GEN. GOLDEN: Yeah, that -- another great question. Thanks for asking that.

And you're right; it is large number of vehicles. And it's really two things that we're concerned with in terms of training the Afghans that will allow them to be successful and allow them to be able to account for and maintain the equipment that they're going to receive.

With the vehicles specifically, I would tell you that our first concern, as we identified this requirement of theirs that we were going to fill, was actually to conduct driver's training for the Afghan policemen, because, as I'm sure you're probably aware, with the literacy rate in Afghanistan and the fact that they've, you know, been embroiled in different forms of civil war and insurgency for the last 33 years, there are a large number of their population, particularly those that we're recruiting for the army and the police, that have never driven a motorized vehicle until they became part of those formations. And so we've concentrated very heavily in the 33 training centers that we operate throughout Afghanistan, with our international and coalition partners, to really focus on driver's training as part of the core of that basic patrolman's course because what we were finding is that more Afghans were actually being killed in motor vehicle accidents than were being killed by the Taliban or insurgents or criminals.

So that's the first piece.

The second piece that goes more directly towards your question about sustainment reflects kind of a philosophy that was here, and that philosophy was that we would -- that we would build the Afghan police force over this three-year period from 2009 to 2012 towards their eventual ceiling of 157,000 but that the last portion of that that we would build would be their logistics and sustainment capability.

We did that for a couple of reasons, first and foremost because we thought that rapidly growing the police towards their strength was required to gain the Afghans the security that's required that would allow, you know, some of the -- some of the core policing functions and the stability and economics of this country to be able to take off. Second, we realized that logistics and sustainment are two of the areas that require a level of specialization where literacy is absolutely required, and the first or second level of literacy probably won't be enough. It will probably require the third level of literacy.

And so we wanted to be able to establish a foundation inside the police and to be able to demonstrate the success of our basic literacy program before we launched into some of those specialized skills that we knew would be in high demand. And so we've -- we're really kind of in the infancy of that. And I would tell you that we've really began our concentrated effort in the logistics and sustainment arenas in the past six months.

And I would also tell you that we're still trying to determine, you know, what the right balance is between an organic sustainment and logistics capability within the police force versus some type of hybrid contracted solution, because quite frankly, what we've found is that we have a large number of professional police that reside within my organization, the Deputy Commander for Police.

In 2009, as the command was stood up, there was only one professional policeman that was part of this -- that was part of the entire NTMA headquarters, and that one professional policeman was an Italian Carabinieri officer. What I would tell you is that today we have over 525 professional policemen, not only Italian Carabinieri, but also French gendarme, Royal Canadian Mounties from Canada, Australian federal police and the rest.

And so as we've discussed the sustainment and logistic issues with these professional police, what we've found is that each of them come from a country where that type of capability does not exist within their professional police forces. It's a capability that they contract out. However, given the reality of Afghanistan's current economic situation as well as the limitations in terms of how large of a police and army force they can sustain in the future, that's why we're looking at some type of hybrid solution between organic and contracted.

So I apologize for the length of my answer but really felt like that type of context was required for you to understand what it is that we're trying to do to make this a sustainable, a capable and an enduring police force.

Q: Thanks.

Just to follow up real quick, so you've -- we've only been instructing the Afghans in logistics and sustainment over the past six months?

GEN. GOLDEN: No, that's when we've surged it. Yeah, we -- no, because we have -- we have a skeleton logistics framework that's stood up right now. We have a provisional national logistics center that's established in Kabul, and we have two different regional logistics centers established in the provinces. We have additional that are out there that are allowed to be picked up, but we have a much more comprehensive plan that we're going to implement.

So obviously, we've done some training before, but now is the period where we have to surge because we've basically got two-and-a-half years to develop that capability, by 2014, so that the majority of that effort is in place as we begin to transition.

Q: Great. And we might be able to do this offline, but is there a way that I can get a list -- that you could send me a list of the equipment and vehicles that we've already furnished and that we are going to furnish over the next -- I guess next year is the big push?

GEN. GOLDEN: Sure. Captain Norris can provide you with that information.

Q: OK, that'd be great. OK, I'll hold on, then. Thanks.

PETTY OFFICER SELBY: And on to Paul -- I'm sorry, Gail.

Q: OK. Gail Harris, with the Foreign Policy Association. Good evening, General.

GEN. GOLDEN: Good evening, ma'am.

Q: I'd like to kind of go back to the follow-on from a question that Chuck asked about the levels of violence. I don't know if you've seen it yet, but the U.N. put out a report saying that there'd been a jump in violence levels of 39 percent over the levels in 2011 (sic). And of course, I understand the Taliban are trying to be high-vis and, you know, raise the stakes and show that they're still in the game. But I was wondering what your thoughts on that were --

GEN. GOLDEN: Well, the first --

Q: -- and how it relates to training. GEN. GOLDEN: Sure. The first observation that I would make is that -- is that -- is that ISAF also tracks the violence statistics. And they and the United Nations are meeting and getting together to try to reconcile their numbers, because ISAF's numbers tell a little different story than the United Nations'.

That being said, and as I said before, I certainly agree that the Taliban has made an attempt, particularly in the last couple of months, as we've approached a couple of key events on their calendar. The first key event that I mentioned before was the first tranche of transition in Afghanistan. The second key event is that we're approaching the end of the traditional fighting season in Afghanistan. And so you can make an argument that the Taliban has not been very successful this fighting season, and so they're doing their very best to try to go out, you know, with a bang instead of a whimper.

And that's important for a couple of reasons. Perhaps the reason that's most important is that without that type of success, they probably will not have a large amount of luck recruiting this winter to take up the fight again next year during the fighting season. And we've -- and we've seen some indicators of that, you know, just from some of the traffic that's been in the media about some of the low-level fighters, you know, not appreciating the fact that many of the Taliban leaders are in safe sanctuary in Pakistan while they're directing them in some of these attacks that are not very successful but result in great losses to the Taliban fighters who are at the lower level here in Afghanistan.

From a -- from a training perspective -- I mean, I think what we're doing from a training perspective is absolutely essential. It's essential because -- and it really goes beyond the police. I mean, it's the police and the army and what we categorize as the Afghan national security forces. But their training into a professional, competent, sustainable and enduring force is absolutely critical for them to gain the confidence of the people here in Afghanistan that they're able to counter the Taliban and that the Taliban is not able to regain a foothold in this country.

I hope that answers your question.

Q: Yes, thank you, sir. That helps me certainly put it in a better perspective. Thank you.

GEN. GOLDEN: You're welcome. Thank you for the question.

PETTY OFFICER SELBY: Anand.

Q: This is Anand from Registan. Major General Golden --

GEN. GOLDEN: Yes.

Q: -- could you ask the ANP Training Command -- commanding general -- I believe that's still Patang -- if he's willing to be interviewed?

GEN. GOLDEN: Sure, I'll ask him that question.

Q: Thank you. Could I ask another question?

GEN. GOLDEN: Absolutely. That was -- that was probably too easy. So I guess I owe you another question, huh?

Q: OK, thanks. There have been repeated press releases from NTM-A stating that at end state be -- there would be about 25,000 -- some say 24,000 -- training seats for the entire ANP. So -- in the most recent press release, that number was revised down to 20,000 and the date by which those training seats would be operational was also -- was pushed back to April of 2013. Could you elaborate on how budget cuts have been reducing the number of project end-state training seats and your thoughts on that?

GEN. GOLDEN: Sure, but I can only tell you what I've know since I've been here. I arrived here at the end of June, and our training capacity then was about 17,000 training seats per year. And that amount has stayed about the same in the three months that I've been here.

What I would -- what I would tell you for the future and the quote about the training seats available in the future is that first of all our modeling shows that to sustain a force of 157,000 in the four pillars and sub-pillars that I've described requires somewhere between 16(,000) and 18,000 training seats per year. What I would -- what I would tell you for the future and the quote about the training seats available in the future is that, first of all, our modeling shows that to sustain a force of 157,000 in the four pillars and subpillars that I've described requires somewhere between 16(,000) and 18,000 training seats per year. And we have initiatives that are currently ongoing where that training capacity that's currently being produced by 33 different training centers across Afghanistan will be reduced to somewhere between 10 and 15, probably, training centers. But each of those training centers' capacity will be expanded so that the dates that you mention in '12 and '13 are when those expansions of existing training centers will be realized. And the net effect will be that 13 training centers in 2014 will be producing the same amount of training centers (sic) as 33 are projected to produce in the next few months.

Q: I think you're --

GEN. GOLDEN: And so the bottom line from that is -- I guess the bottom line from that is we've made a huge investment up front, primarily in infrastructure, to build and expand these training centers that's a one-time sunk cost beyond their maintenance in the future. And so although we anticipate the amount of monetary resources decreasing in the future, this was actually part of the plan all along and took into account the sunk cost up front for the infrastructure. I hope that answers your question.

Q: Thank you.

PETTY OFFICER SELBY: And we might time for a few more questions. Is that all right, sir?

GEN. GOLDEN: Sure.

PETTY OFFICER SELBY: Chuck, you can go ahead with yours. MORE

Q: Thank you.

General, can you speak to two related issues? First of all, the women in the Afghan National Police, and if you have any numbers. And also, the ethnic mix and how that works within the four pillars.

GEN. GOLDEN: Say again your second question. I got the first one, women in ANP. What was your second question?

Q: The ethnic mix within the various components of the force.

GEN. GOLDEN: Sure. Let me just write that down so I don't forget any of your questions.

Chuck, first of all, I'd like to follow up with you. You asked me about the numbers for the Afghan anticrime police.

Q: Correct.

GEN. GOLDEN: Yeah. Their numbers are just over 7,600.

Q: OK.

And they're the equivalent of detectives from an American framework?

GEN. GOLDEN: Yeah, that's probably a simplified view. Criminal investigation division, forensics, some counternarcotics, other forms of police specialty skills.

Q: OK. Thank you.

PETTY OFFICER SELBY: And Paul.

GEN. GOLDEN: And then -- oh, I got -- I still owe him a couple more answers.

PETTY OFFICER SELBY: Sorry about that. Sorry about that, sir.

GEN. GOLDEN: It's all right.

The first one -- or I'll address the second question you asked me first. Everybody still there? Q: Yes.

GEN. GOLDEN: Chuck, you're still there?

Q: Yeah.

GEN. GOLDEN: OK. The question you asked me about the ethnicity of the ANP: The first thing that I would point out to you -- I'll quote you statistics and numbers, if you like -- but what I'd like to point out to you is that the Afghan National Police, as opposed to the Afghan

National Army, recruits locally and employs the police locally for the majority of the police positions.

So the end result is that our ethnic mix basically reflects Afghan society because the Afghan police are among the people. And so just for example, I'll throw a few quotes out here for you:

Pashtun make up 44 percent of the Afghan population; they make up 42.58 percent of the police population. The Tajiks make up 25 percent of the Afghan population; they're over-represented at 41.77 percent. Uzbeks are 8 percent of the population; make up 5.55 percent. Hazaras make up 10 percent of the population, and 4.47 percent of the Afghan police.

I have percentages for two, four, six -- eight other ethnic minorities where the total of them make up 13 percent of the ethnic population; each is represented as part of the police. So that's where we stand with ethnicity.

In terms of women in the Afghan National Police, I think it's important to point out that one of Afghanistan's issues -- and it varies somewhat by region -- are gender equality and gender diversity. That being said, today in the Afghan National Police we have about 1,204 women, and of those women, we have a -- we have a goal for the next two -- next three years, to increase that number to 5,000. It's obviously easier to recruit them in some provinces than others, but we are making progress.

I hope the -- I hope that answers your question.

Q: That's great, General. Thank you.

GEN. GOLDEN: You're welcome.

I think we have time for one more question.

PETTY OFFICER SELBY: Thank you, sir.

Paul.

Q: Yes, sir. Thanks. Just to follow up on the logistics question from before, how confident are you in the ability right now of ANP, you know, acting on their own out at one of their own outposts, to be able to care for their equipment and repair their equipment; and if not, you know, to kind of just send it up through proper channels to -- and bring it back to a depot to be repaired?

GEN. GOLDEN: Well, first of all, I mean, I think with the concept you're describing, you're confusing the Army with the police; because, again, the police are -- the police are never designed to have their own organic capability for depot-level maintenance, for example. And that's partly why we've chosen the equipment -- Ford Ranger pickups, for example; up-armored Humvees; AK-47s; other types of weapons -- so that they would be enduring and sustainable.

As it exists right now, the majority of the maintenance is conducted by a contract, and an evolution is being made to allow some form of operator-level maintenance. But as I told you before, the future is envisioned to be a hybrid between organic and contracted capacity, primarily because we don't want to grow the Afghan National Police a logistics structure that's organic that they won't be able to sustain in the future.

Q: And the contract, is this Afghan contractors, or is this a Western contractor? I mean, is it -- is it one contract for all the maintenance, or do you have -- do you do local contracts to do this?

GEN. GOLDEN: We award -- we award a contract that is then subcontracted, within capability, to Afghans. But really, that's a question you should probably ask General Fuller from DCOM programs, for the particular contracting questions, because, again, we identify the requirement and then they satisfy the contracting language and what will actually fulfill it in terms of those type of details.

Q: Great. And you said there's 2.7 billion (dollars) worth of equipment coming in 2012 to the ANA and ANP?

GEN. GOLDEN: That's correct.

Q: That's ANA and ANP, right?

GEN. GOLDEN: That's correct. That's right, ANA and ANP.

Q: And how much is the ANP slice of that --

GEN. GOLDEN: Well, thank you very much. I want to thank all of you. I have a closing statement here. I apologize for running out of time. But I'd like to thank you for joining me tonight. It's been a pleasure to speak with you about what we're doing to improve and build a sustainable Afghan National Police force. With the improved eight-week basic training class, literacy training, and focus on quality versus quantity, I think that the four pillars of the ANP will continue to improve. All of the incoming equipment will help improve their capabilities, and the people of Afghanistan will see the positive changes in their police men and women. And as 2014 approaches, the transition of the ANP to Afghan control will be a logical and progressive step.

Thank you again for your time. I appreciate it, and I look forward to doing this again.

PETTY OFFICER SELBY: Thank you very much, sir. Today's program will be available online at dodlive.mil, where you'll be able to access a story based on today's call, along with the source documents such as an audio file and print transcript. Again, thank you to everybody on the line. This concludes today's event, and feel free to disconnect at this time.

END.

